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Abstract
In this paper, we explore how, and if, free choice permission (FCP)
can be accepted when we consider deontic conflicts between certain types
of permissions and obligations. As is well known, FCP can license, under
some minimal conditions, the derivation of an indefinite number of permis-
sions. We discuss this and other drawbacks and present six Hilbert-style
classical deontic systems admitting a guarded version of FCP. The sys-
tems that we present are not too weak from the inferential viewpoint,
as far as permission is concerned, and do not commit to weakening any
specific logic for obligations.
1 Introduction and Background
A significant part of the literature in deontic logic revolves around the discus-
sions of puzzles and paradoxes which show that certain logical systems are not
acceptable—typically, this happens with deontic KD, i.e., Standard Deontic
Logic (SDL)—or which suggest that obligations and permissions should enjoy
some desirable properties.
One well-known puzzle is the the so-called Free Choice Permission paradox,
which was originated by the following remark by von Wright in [23, p. 21]:
“On an ordinary understanding of the phrase ‘it is permitted that’,
the formula ‘P(p∨q)’ seems to entail ‘Pp∧Pq’. If I say to somebody
‘you may work or relax’ I normally mean that the person addressed
has my permission to work and also my permission to relax. It is up
to him to choose between the two alternatives.”
Usually, this intuition is formalised by the following schema:
P(p ∨ q)→ (Pp ∧Pq) (FCP)
Many problems have been discussed in the literature around FCP: for a
comprehensive overview, discussion, and some solutions, see [11, 14, 20].
Three basic difficulties can be identified, among the others [11, p. 43]:
• Problem 1: Permission Explosion Problem – “That if anything is
permissible, then everything is, and thus it would also be a theorem that
nothing is obligatory,” [20], for example “If you may order a soup, then it
is not true that you ought to pay the bill” [6];
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• Problem 2: Closure under Logical Equivalence Problem – “In
its classical form FCP entails that classically equivalent formulas can be
substituted to the scope of a permission operator. This is also implausible:
It is permitted to eat an apple or not iff it is permitted to sell a house or
not”;
• Problem 3: Resource Sensitivity Problem – “Many deontic logics
become resource-insensitive in the presence of FCP. They validate infer-
ences of the form ‘if the patient with stomach trouble is allowed to eat one
cookie then he is allowed to eat more than one’ ”.
In this paper, we focus on another basic problem: how, and if, FCP can be
accepted when we have incompatibilities between certain varieties of permissions
and prohibitions/obligations. The issue is that since Problem 1 licenses the
derivation that anything is permitted provided that something is permitted, no
prohibition/obligation is allowed, otherwise we get an inconsistency [20]. In
doing so, we will offer simple logics that take two of the three problems above
into account.
The layout of the paper is as follows. The remainder of this section briefly
comments on the three major problems mentioned above: the Permission Ex-
plosion Problem (Section 1.1), the Closure under Logical Equivalence Problem
(Section 1.2), and the Resource Sensitivity Problem (1.3). Section 2 illustrates
the theoretical intuitions and assumptions that we adopt to analyse free choice
permission. In particular, we assume the distinction between norms and obliga-
tions/permissions, and we study the role of deontic incompatibilities, the duality
principle, and why free choice permission is strong permission. Section 3 reviews
in some detail two related works that have direct implications for our proposal.
Finally, Section 4 presents some minimal deontic systems, six Hilbert-style deon-
tic systems admitting guarded variants of FCP: the systems that we present are
not too weak from the inferential viewpoint, as far as permission is concerned,
and do not commit to weakening any specific logic for obligations. Some con-
clusions end the paper. An appendix offers proofs of the formal properties of
the proposed systems presented in Section 4.
1.1 Problem 1: Permission Explosion Problem
One of the most acute problems springing from FCP is obtained in SDL, where,
if at least one obligationOp is true, then by necessitation and propositional logic,
we get O(p∨q). Since axiom D is in SDL, i.e Op→ ¬O¬p is valid, we trivially
obtain ¬O¬(p ∨ q), thus, assuming the Duality principle
P =def ¬O¬ (Duality)
we derive through FCP that Pq. Hence, SDL licenses that, if something is
obligatory, then everything is permitted.
However, a careful analysis shows that this undesired result is not strictly
due to SDL as such, but to adopting any monotonic modal deontic logic [10],
i.e. any system just equipped with inference rule RM:
⊢ p→ q
⊢ Op→ Oq
. (RM)
or, alternatively with
⊢ p ≡ q
⊢ Op ≡ Oq
. (RE)
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plus the following axiom schema
O(a ∧ b)→ (Oa ∧Ob). (M)
Indeed, assume Classical Propositional Logic (CPL), FCP, and RM for P1
and consider the following derivation:
1. p→ (p ∨ q) CPL
2. Pp→ P(p ∨ q) 1,RM
3. Pp→ (Pp ∧Pq) 2,FCP,CPL
4. Pp→ Pq 3,CPL
In this context, it is enough if we have that Pp is true to derive that any
other permission Pq, i.e., Pp ⊢ Pq for any p, q. Whenever FCP is accepted,
such a problem strictly depends on the characteristic schemas and inference
rules of monotonic modal logics, as the above derivation—or a simple semantic
analysis—shows. Hence, permission explosion is not a problem of SDL, but of
any weaker modal deontic logic which is at least closed under classical implica-
tion or which is closed under logical equivalence and allows for the distribution
of P over implication. Notice that Duality plays no substantial role. Accord-
ingly, we can have that RM is valid for permission, if P and O are duals and
the logic for O is a monotonic modal logic, or P is independent of O and RM
is assumed for P.
In conclusion, if we want not to completely reject the intuition behind FCP,
we have two non-exclusive options to be explored in order to avoid the Permis-
sion Explosion Problem:
No-CPL: abandon CPL and adopt suitable non-classical logical connectives;
No-RM: abandon inference rule RM (or schema M) and endorse very weak
modal logics (i.e., the classical ones [10, chap. 8]).2
Our paper aims at exploring under what conditionsNo-CPL can be avoided
by accepting at least a restricted version of FCP. Hence, it seems that No-RM
thesis must be accepted.
1.2 Problem 2: Closure under Logical Equivalence Problem
In the previous section we mentioned that RM must be weakened. Hence, we
can also dropRE and keep axiom schemaM. This choice could look satisfactory
for those who consider problematic the fact that the logic for P is closed under
logical equivalence.
We take here another route. Incidentally, one can argue that the implausibil-
ity of “It is permitted to eat an apple or not iff it is permitted to sell a house or
not” does not depend on RE, but rather on the fact that “It is permitted to eat
an apple or not” is P⊤, which looks quite odd. However, besides this problem—
which would lead us to commit to specific philosophical views—dropping RE
has in general two controversial technical side effects:
1I.e.,
⊢ p→ q
⊢ Pp→ Pq
. (RM-P)
Indeed, it is standard result that every system closed under RM for an operator is closed
under the rule of the dual of the operator [cf. 10, p. 238–239, 243]. We will use RM to refer
in general to the rule ⊢ p→ q/ ⊢ ✷p→ ✷q for any modal operator ✷.
2We state in Section 1.2 why it is convenient not to drop RE.
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• it rejects standard semantics for modal logics, since the class of all neigh-
bourhood frames validate RE: [10] argued in fact that classical systems
(i.e., containing RE but not RM) are the minimal modal logics;
• it fails to make, for instance, Op and P¬p logically incompatible under
the Duality Principle (while Op and ¬Op of course are); similarly, O¬p
and O¬¬p, or O(p ∨ q) and O(¬p ∧ ¬q), are not incompatible too (while
they of course should be).
In conclusion, we standardly assume that RE holds both for permissions
and obligations, which means that any logic for free choice permission must be
a classical system of deontic logic in [10]’s sense, i.e., any modal deontic logic
closed under logical equivalence and not under logical consequence.
1.3 Problem 3: Resource Sensitivity Problem
It has been noted [17] that from “You may eat an apple or a pear”, one can
infer “You may eat an apple and that You may eat a pear”, but not “You may
eat an apple and a pear” [7, p. 2].
We simply observe that the systems proposed in Section 4 do not license in
general the inference above. However, a thoughtful treatment of this problem—
the Resource Sensitivity Problem—goes beyond the scope of this paper. In
fact, it has been widely discussed in the literature that it is strictly related
to considerations from action theory, which have often found solutions shifting
from CPL to non-classical logics such as the substructural ones [see, among
others, 4, 7, 11].
In conclusion, we do not commit here to find any suitable solution to such
a problem.
2 Three Basic Intuitions
We are going to present some deontic systems that accommodate restricted
variants of FCP. This is done under some minimal philosophical assumptions,
which can in principle be compatible with several deontic theories. Of course,
our approach is not neutral. In this section, we illustrate our fundamental
intuitions and assumptions.
2.1 The Distinction between Norms and Obligations
We assume in the background a conceptual distinction between norms, on one
side, and obligations and permissions, on the other side. The general idea of
norms is that they describe conditions under which some behaviours are deemed
as ‘legal’. In the simplest case, a behaviour can be qualified by an obligation
(or a prohibition, or a permission), but often norms additionally specify the
consequences of not complying with them, and what sanctions follow from vio-
lations and whether such sanctions compensate for the violations. The scintilla
for this idea is the very influential contribution [1], which is complementary to
the (modal) logic-based approaches to deontic logic. The key feature of this ap-
proach is that norms are dyadic constructs connecting applicability conditions
to a deontic consequence. A large number of such pairs would constitute an
interconnected system called a normative system [for more recent proposals in
this direction, see 12, 13, 18, 19].
To be clear, this paper does not present any logic of norms, but our proposal
for a logic of obligations and permissions—with restricted variants of FCP—
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can be better understood if one keeps in mind some intuitions about how norms
should logically behave and about the relation between the logic of norms and
deontic logic. In particular, our assumptions are:
• obligations and permissions exist because norms generate them when ap-
plicable;
• once obligations and permissions are generated from norms—which re-
quires us to reason about norms—we can still perform some reasoning
with the resulting obligations and permissions—this is the task of deontic
logic in a strict sense, i.e., the logic of obligations and permissions;
• norms can be in conflict—without being inconsistent— but this does not
hold for obligations and permissions.
Hence, we distinguish two levels of analysis: a norm-logic level and a result-
ing deontic-logic level. This paper only technically deals with the second level
of analysis.
Assume for example that we have two norms n1 : p⇒ O¬q and n2 : p⇒ Pq,
where ⇒ is any if-then suitable logical relation connecting applicability condi-
tions of norms and their deontic effects. We can indeed have them—for example,
in a legal system—but the point is what obligations/permissions we can obtain
from them. A rather standard assumption is that in order to correctly derive
deontic conclusions we need to solve the conflict between n1 and n2. Specifically,
our general view is prudent (or skeptical, as one says in non-monotonic logics),
because, unless we know how to solve the conflict (typically, by establishing that
n1 is stronger than n2 or vice versa), we do not know if O¬q or Pq holds. Since
we do not accept that both can hold, it is pointless to consider at the deontic
level that O¬q and Pq are true—while any logic of norms can have both n1 and
n2.
In conclusion, we impose deontic consistency at the deontic-logic level, i.e.,
Op ∧O¬p→ ⊥.
2.2 Deontic Incompatibilities, Duality, and FCP
With the above said, the issue is whether FCP is an appropriate principle
to adopt for normative reasoning. Our view is that this principle in general
is not, even when Problem 1 and 2 above are solved. We provide below a
simple counterexample to it, which considers the interplay between free choice
permissions and prohibitions.
Example 2.1
When you have dinner with guests the etiquette allows you to eat or to have a
conversation with your fellow guests. However, it is forbidden to speak while
eating.
The full representation of the example is that each choice is permitted when
one refrains from exercising the other one. In a situation when one eats, there
is the prohibition to speak, while when one speaks, there is the prohibition to
eat. Hence, it means that we can detach any single permission only if the con-
tent of such permission is not forbidden. Given that Example 2.1 provides a
counterexample to FCP, the question is whether we want to derive the indi-
vidual permissions when one of the two disjuncts holds and we already satisfy
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the disjunctive permission. The reason is that the individual permissions, each
on its own, can trigger other obligations or permissions. The following example
illustrates this scenario.
Example 2.2
Suppose a shop has the following policy for clothes bought online. If the size of
an item is not a perfect fit, then the customer is entitled to either exchange the
item for free or to keep the item and receive a 10 refund. However, customers
electing to keep the item are not entitled to the refund, and customers opting
for the refund are not entitled to exchange the item for free. Furthermore,
customers who elect to exchange the item (when entitled to do so) have to
return it with the original package.
The example can be formalised as follows:
online ∧ ¬fit → P(exchange ∨ refund)
exchange → O¬refund
refund → O¬exchange
Pexchange ∧ exchange → Ooriginal
Suppose that a customer elects to exchange an item bought online that is not
a perfect fit instead of asking for the refund. Intuitively, given that we cannot
derive that exchanging is not forbidden (O¬exchange) at least the weak permis-
sion of exchanging the item should hold. However, in a deontic logic without
FCP (or a restricted version of it) we are not able to derive the permission, and
then we are not able to derive other obligations or permissions depending on it:
in the example, the obligation to return the item with the original package.
We will return in Section 2.3 to the logical import of the above scenarios in a
classical system of deontic logic. For the moment, taking stock of the examples
we just notice that FCP could be reformulated as follows:
(P(p ∨ q) ∧ (¬O¬p ∧ ¬O¬q))→ (Pp ∧Pq). (1)
However, assuming Duality, ¬O¬p is equivalent to Pp, thus (1) reduces to
(P(p ∨ q) ∧ (Pp ∧Pq))→ (Pp ∧Pq). (2)
(2) is a propositional tautology. Thus, (1) does not extend the expressive power
of the logic unless one assumes a logic where obligation and permission are not
the duals.
2.3 Strong Permission, Classical Systems, and FCP
When permission is no longer the dual of obligation, we enter the territory of
strong permission [2, 3, 22]3. As is well-known, while it is sufficient to show
that O¬p is not the case to argue that p is weakly permitted, this does not hold
for strong permission, for which the normative system explicitly says that there
exists at least one norm permitting p [3, p. 353–355].
In order to keep track of these two cases at the deontic-logic level, we can
standardly distinguish in the deontic language two permission operators, Pw
3Besides von Wright’s theory [22], there is another sense in the literature of strong permis-
sion [15]. We will briefly return on this in Section 3.2.
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for weak permission (such that Pwp =def ¬O¬p) and Ps for strong permission
(where Duality does not hold).
What is the minimal logic of strong permission at the deontic level in which
some reasonable version of free choice permission can be accepted?
We mentioned that RM must be rejected. In fact, besides the Permission
Explosion Problem, one may also argue that it is reasonable not to derive Ps(p∨
q) from any Psp because we could have in the background that the normative
system consists just of an explicit norm a ⇒ Psp. If we have that, in presence
of some version of free choice permission, you may also detach Psq, which is
against the above-mentioned intuition that the strong permission should follow
from explicit norms, or from combinations of them in normative systems where
all disjuncts are explicitly considered [see, e.g., the discussion in 3, p. 354–355].
Second, as said above, deontic consistency should be ensured:
Op ∧Ps¬p→ ⊥ (Ds)
Op ∧O¬p→ ⊥ (Dw)
Notice that Dw is the standardD axiom of Standard Deontic Logic establishing
the so called external consistency of obligations that, in turn, implies consistency
among obligations and (weak) permissions. From Ds we obtain, as expected,
that strong permission entails weak permission [see, e.g., 3, p. 354], but not the
other way around:
Psp→ Pwp.
This is reasonable because the fact that at the norm-level we derive that p is
permitted using an explicit permissive norm n means that no prohibitive norm
n′ (forbidding p) successfully applies or prevails over n.
What about free choice permission? Coupling Assumptions 1 and 2 with the
distinction between weak and strong permission allows us to identify a guarded
variant of FCP for strong permission, consisting of two schemata:
(Ps(p ∨ q) ∧O¬p)→ Psq (AFCPO)
(Ps(p ∨ q) ∧Pwp ∧Pwq)→ (Psp ∧Psq) (AFCPP)
These schemata take stock of what we said: you can detach from a disjunc-
tive strong permission any single strong permission only if this last is weakly
permitted.
The idea of the combination of the two axioms is that from repeated applica-
tions of AFCPO and from a disjunctive permission, we can obtain the maximal
sub-disjunction such that no element is forbidden, and then, the application of
the AFCPP allows us to derive the individual strong permissions that are not
forbidden. Notice that we cannot assume the following formula as the axiom
for free choice permission.
Ps
( n∨
i=1
pi
)
∧
(m<n∧
j=1
O¬pj
)
→
n∧
k=m+1
Pspk
The problem is that we do not know in advance how many elements of the
disjunctive permission are (individually) forbidden. Consider for example, a
theory consisting of the following formulas:
Ps(p ∨ q ∨ r ∨ s ∨ t) O¬p O¬q O¬r
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Here, one could use the conjunction O¬p∧O¬q to obtain Psr, Pss and Pst, but
then we have a contradiction from Psr and O¬r (from axiom Ds). Notice, that
in general, we are not able to useAFCPO to detach a single (strong) permission,
but a disjunction corresponding to the “remainder” of the disjunction, that is, in
the case above, Ps(s∨ t). Then, we can use the AFCPP to “lift” the remaining
elements from weak permissions to strong permissions. The only case when
we can obtain an individual strong permission from a permissive disjunction is
when the remainder is a singleton; but this means, that all the other elements of
the permissive disjunction were forbidden. This further means that a disjunctive
strong permission holds if at least one of its elements can be legally exercised.
Going back to the example, if one extends the theory with O¬s, then we can
derive Pst.
Let us consider again the situation described in Example 2.1. The scenario
can be formalised as follows (where e and s stand, respectively for “to eat” and
“to speak”):
Ps(e ∨ s)
s→ O¬e
e→ O¬s
In a logic endorsing the unrestricted version of free choice permission, we have
Pse and Pss. This means that as soon as one exercises one of the choices, we get
that the other choice is at the same time permitted and forbidden, a situation
that is either paradoxical or contradictory. Thus, the only way to avoid this kind
of conflict is to refrain from exercising any of the two choices. However, this
means that one is not really free to choose between the two options. Accordingly,
either one has to adopt a restricted version of the free choice permission or
abandon it. Notice, that axiom AFCPO allows us to conclude that given e, s
is forbidden (O¬s), and thus that e is permitted (Pse); similarly, one gets Pss
from s, which implies O¬e. Similarly, for Example 2.2 when we formalise it
using strong permission Ps instead of P, Axiom AFCPO allows us to derive
Psexchange from which we can conclude Ooriginal .
Consider AFCPP. One may argue why, in symmetry with AFCPO, we
cannot rather have
(Ps(p ∨ q) ∧Pwp)→ Psp (AFCP2P)
Technically, it is obvious that AFCP2P implies AFCPP but not the other way
around, so both options are available. The variant AFCPP is more prudent in
that it licenses the detachment of an individual strong permission only if the
normative system explicitly deals with that specific disjunct, while the second
allows for the derivation in a slightly more relaxed way. So, if one wants to
strictly reframe the structure of standard FCP in a guarded version but does
not want AFCP2P, then AFCPP is the right option.
We should notice that the above schemata for free choice permission do not
necessarily require the technical idea of deontic consistency, unless we assume—
but we don’t—that obligation implies strong permission, and despite the fact
that the consistency problem can occur if we endorse Ds—as we do— and so
that strong permission implies weak permission. In fact, if we do not validate
RM, we would need anyway to model the following scenario
(Ps(p ∨ q) ∧O(¬p ∧ r))→ Psq (3)
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as a true instance of our intuition, despite the fact that O(¬p ∧ r) and Psp are
not inconsistent. One may rather argue that any state exercising the permission
Psp –i.e., a state where p holds– does not comply with O(¬p ∧ r). If so, the
condition that detached permissions are compliant with obligations is a rational
requirement for free choice permission, which is not technically needed in clas-
sical modal systems for ensuring standard logical consistency between deontic
statements.4
Therefore, if one wants to consider (3) as an instance of free choice permission
in logics that do not satisfyRM, we need to replaceAFCPO andAFCPP with
the following inference rules:
Ps(p ∨ q) ∧Or ⊢ r → ¬p
Psq
(IFCPO)
Ps(p ∨ q) ∧ (Pwr ∧Pws) ⊢ r → p ⊢ s→ q
Psp ∧Psq
. (IFCPP)
Of course, the same remark we made for AFCPP and AFCP2P holds here,
too, so we may have the following alternative:
Ps(p ∨ q) ∧Pwr ⊢ r → p
Psp
. (IFCP2P)
In the discussion leading to the formulation of the inference rules above, we
provided the intuition and an example for IFCPO. Let us now examine a few
interesting cases for IFCPP and IFCP2P. For the first case, we consider the
following instance
Ps(p ∨ q), Pw(p ∧ r)
In a logic with RM we can derive Pwp from Pw(p ∧ r), since (p ∧ r) → p is
a tautology. The inference rules IFCP2P and IFCPP allow us to replicate
this type of reasoning without being forced to derive Pwp, thus we can apply
IFCP2P to the instance above to obtain Psp.
The second situation is given by the following theory:
Ps(p ∨ q ∨ r), Pwp, Pwq, O¬r
Since p→ p∨r and q → q∨r are tautologies, the theory implies, by applications
of IFCP2P, Psp, Psq, Ps(p ∨ r) and Ps(q ∨ r).
It is easy to verify that RM in conjunction with any of the axiom AFCPO,
AFCPP and AFCP2P makes the corresponding inference rules admissible.
But, as we have seen in Section 2.3, the combination of FCP and RM leads
to the Permission Explosion Problem. This is not the case when we replace
FCP with AFCPP (or AFCP2P or the corresponding inference rules), since
the guarded version of free choice permission allows us to derive an individual
strong permission from a disjunctive (strong) permission containing the individ-
ual element only when we have that the individual permission is also weakly
permitted. In general, the axiom and inference schemata we have proposed
4Indeed, it is a trivial result in classical systems that the inference of O¬p from O(¬p∧r) is
not in general valid. Semantically, it is also immediate to build a neighbourhood model which
falsifies that inference or which, in a similar perspective, admits the truth of both O(¬p ∧ r)
and Psp. (This holds if Ps is treated as an independent ✷ operator with no further conditions.)
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do not suffer from the permission explosion, though the resulting logics have
a “controlled” permission explosion in the sense that every weak permission is
lifted to a strong permission in case a tautology is explicitly strongly permitted,
as the following derivation shows:
1. Ps(p ∨ ¬p) Hyp.
2. Pwq Hyp.
3. Ps(q ∨ p ∨ ¬p) 1, RE
4. Psq 1, 2, 3, AFCPP
The consequence of the controlled permission explosion is that whenever the
logic for the strong permission is a normal modality, the notion of strong per-
mission collapses to that of weak permission.To avoid this issue one could either
impose the axiom ¬Ps⊤or reject RE; however, the later seems to be more prob-
lematic (see the discussion in Section 1.2 or part of the discussion in Section 3.1
below).
3 Two Related Works
In this section we review in some detail two related works that have directly
implications with respect to our proposal [5, 6]. In fact, even though they have
a different philosophical backgrounds, they propose simple non-normal axioma-
tisations for obligation and permission—as we do—which avoid, e.g., Problem
1 and which are based on the concept of free choice permission as strong per-
mission or, anyway, as a type of permission without Duality.
3.1 Asher and Bonevac’s Analysis
Asher and Bonevac [6]’s analysis presents a deontic logic based on Anderson-
Kanger reduction of obligations and permissions. Assume S denotes as usual
Sanction. Then, Oa =def ✷(a → S)—where ✷ is an S5 operator—is dropped
by introducing a suitable and weak conditional logic for >, such that
Oa =def (¬a > S) Psa =def (a > ¬S)
Obligations and permissions are defined through the concept of sanction, but
Duality no longer holds, since Asher and Bonevac [6] argue that free choice
permission is strong permission.
The logic for > is not closed under logical equivalence in conditional an-
tecedents, so the resulting Ps and O are not closed under logical equivalence.
The overall system is non-monotonic and can naturally handle cases such as the
ones expressed in AFCPO.
So, we share with [6] important assumptions. However, Asher and Bonevac’s
proposal suffers from some drawbacks that we consider difficult to accept. Be-
sides the fact that the closure under logical equivalence does not hold (see Sec-
tion 1.2), consider the following scenario [6, p. 311]:
Example 3.1 (Soup-Eggroll scenario [6])
Assume that OK =def ¬S.
“Suppose we go to the Chinese restaurant. There its part of the
context that while you may have soup or eggroll, you cant have
both. Thus,
¬(A > OK ) ∨ ¬(B > OK )
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holds. But while we now can derive defeasibly that you may have,
e.g., an eggroll, you can’t have both eggroll and soup, at least with-
out paying extra.”
The Soup-Eggroll scenario, as analysed by [6], is debatable. Indeed, the
fact that you can’t have both soup and eggroll means that having both is for-
bidden. The point is that a prohibition amounts here to the fact that both
strong permissions are false rather that having O¬(soup ∧ eggroll ), namely,
O(¬soup ∨ ¬eggroll ). This is due to the fact that, in the example, prohibition
is the negation of strong permission and not the obligation of the opposite.
Consider the following example. In some card games, it is obligatory not to
play a trump card when one is the first to play; this can be expressed as when
one is the first to play it is forbidden to play a trump card. Intuitively those
two statements seem to be equivalent, but their formal representation, namely
(¬¬trump > S) ¬(trump > ¬S)
are not. Notice, also, that, since the first statement contains a negation and
the logic for > is not closed under logical equivalence, the proper translation is
with the double negation, and as a consequence, (¬¬a > S) and (a > S) are
not equivalent; while this might be acceptable in deontic logics based on non-
involutive multi-valued logics, it seems counterintuitive when the underlying
logic is the bivalent classical propositional logic.
In conclusion, while [6] has the great merit of identifying fundamental intu-
itions for free choice permission, it fails to frame those intuitions in a convincing
general theory of obligations.
3.2 Open Reading of Permission and Obligation as Weakest Permis-
sion
A more recent proposal discussing free choice permission is due to [5], though
the philosophical background of this work is significantly different from ours.
First of all, [5] works on the concept of open reading of permissions [9, 16].
Consider that “it is permitted to board the plane”—Pp—and assume that p is
an action type, i.e., something saying that “there are many, mutually exclusive
action tokens of that type”. Hence, there “might be many ways to board a plane.
There might be more than one gate to go through, there might be several times
within a fixed period when one can proceed, etc.”, i.e., there are many action
tokens [5, p. 808]. How to read Pp [16]? The authors adopt the so-called open
reading, according to which at least one token of type p (but possibly not all)
is acceptable according to the normative system.5
Hence, rational obligations and permissions should be seen, respectively, as
giving necessary and sufficient conditions for rational agents (typically, in game-
theoretic settings) [5, sec. 2.3]. An action type p is obligatory whenever it is ex-
actly the normatively ideal action type: obligation as weakest permission. This
means that “playing any action type that rules out being rational is forbidden.
This is not the case in the logic of obligations as weakest permissions. There
the unique obligation bearing on the players is to play a rational strategy” [11,
p. 17].
5Permission defined through the open reading is sometimes called strong permission [15],
which is different from [22]’s notion [see 5, p. 808, fn. 1]. We can ignore this issue here, by
generically assuming that strong permission is just not the dual of obligation.
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We believe that this contribution may have a general import on the debate on
permission, which goes beyond the philosophical discussion on the open reading.
Technically, the modal system of [5] is classical, too, in [10]’s sense, and P
is not the dual of O, but an independent ✷-operator.
Conceptually, it is interesting in general to explore a deontic logic that allows
for deriving a unique obligation [5, p. 817]. If we assume the distinction between
norms and obligations, then this means that, given a normative systemN whose
norms prescribe a1, . . . , an, then we can only have in the deontic logic O(a1 ∧
· · · ∧ an) but not, for example, any obligation Oak (1 ≤ k ≤ n). This means
two things: (a) M : O(a ∧ b) → Oa ∧Ob is not valid thus leading to rejecting
RM, (b) we exclude the possibility of having any norm supporting some other
conclusion, which is made applicable by one single obligation.
As for point (b), while in several cases it is not harmful to only derive
the entire obligative conjunctive content of a normative system—this is not a
problem for checking compliance, for instance—there are cases where one may
need to logically speak of single obligations. Consider a normative system, which
states that some obligations are conjunctively typical only of a certain type of
entities—as many legal systems do. For instance, assume that O(a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an)
holds only for specific commercial entities, such as corporations. This means
that
O(a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an) ≡ Corporation
However, this cannot exclude that a subset of those obligations (e.g., a1 and a2)
implies that your company is a partnership:
O(a1 ∧ a2)→ Partnership.
That this is not admitted in a deontic logic looks to us too restrictive if we go
beyond the domain of the open reading of permission.
4 Six Minimal Deontic Axiomatisations with Guarded Free
Choice Permission
Finally, we present some minimal deontic systems, six Hilbert-style deontic sys-
tems admitting a guarded version of FCP. The systems that we present are not
too weak from the inferential viewpoint, as far as permission is concerned, and
do not commit to weakening any specific logic for obligations.
4.1 Language, Axioms and Inference Rules
The modal language and the concept of well formed formula are defined as usual
[see 8, 10]. We just recall that we have three modal operators, two ✷ operators,
O for obligations and Ps for strong permissions, and Pw for weak permission.
As usual, we assume Pw to be an abbreviation for ¬O¬.
For convenience, let us synoptically recall below all relevant schemata and
inference rules, where ✷ ∈ {O,Ps}.
Inference Rules:
RE := ⊢ A ≡ B ⇒ ⊢ ✷A↔ ✷B
RM := ⊢ A→ B ⇒ ⊢ ✷A→ ✷B
IFCPO := Ps(p ∨ q) ∧Or and ⊢ r → ¬p ⇒ Psq
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Deontic System Properties Derivable
E := RE
Min := RE⊕Ds ⊕Dw PsPw
FCP1 :=Min⊕ IFCPO ⊕ IFCPP PsPw
AFCPO, AFCPP
FCP2 :=Min⊕AFCPO ⊕AFCPP FCP2 ⊂ FCP1 PsPw
FCP3 := FCP2 ⊕M FCP1 ⊂ FCP3 PsPw
IFCPO, IFCPP
FCP4 :=Min⊕AFCPO ⊕AFCP2P FCP2 ⊂ FCP4 PsPw, AFCPP
FCP5 :=Min⊕ IFCPO ⊕ IFCP2P FCP1 ⊂ FCP5 PsPw, IFCPP
FCP4 ⊂ FCP5 AFCPO, AFCPP
AFCP2P
FCP6 := FCP4 ⊕M FCP3 ⊂ FCP6 PsPw, IFCPP
FCP5 ⊂ FCP6 AFCPO, AFCPP
AFCP2P, IFCP2P
IFCPO, IFCP2O
Table 1: Deontic Systems
IFCPP := Ps(p ∨ q) ∧ (Pwr ∧Pws), ⊢ r → p and ⊢ s→ q ⇒ Psp ∧Psq
IFCP2P := Ps(p ∨ q) ∧Pwr, ⊢ r → p ⇒ Psp.
Schemata:
M := ✷(p ∧ q)→ (✷p ∧ ✷q)
AFCPO := (Ps(p ∨ q) ∧O¬p)→ Psq
AFCPP := (Ps(p ∨ q) ∧Pwp ∧Pwq)→ (Psp ∧Psq)
AFCP2P := (Ps(p ∨ q) ∧Pwp)→ Psp
Ds := Op ∧Ps¬p→ ⊥
Dw := Op ∧Pw¬p→ ⊥
PsPw := Psp→ Pwp.
Given the discussion of Section 2, we can identify some deontic systems, as
specified in Table 4.1. Notice that we consider also systems FCP3 and FCP6,
which are monotonic, so they contain RM. Strictly speaking, this is the limit
which we cannot trespass, since we have three restricted forms of Permission
Explosion. We will return on this in the concluding section of the paper.
4.2 Semantics and System Properties
Let us begin with standard concepts. Assume that PROP is the set of atomic
sentences.
Definition 4.1. A deontic neighbourhood frame F is a structure 〈W,NO,NP〉
where
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
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• NO and NP are functions W 7→ 22
W
.
Definition 4.2. A deontic neighbourhood model M is a structure
〈W,NO,NP, V 〉 where 〈W,NO,NP〉 is a deontic neighbourhood frame and V is
an evaluation function PROP 7→ 2W .
Definition 4.3 (Truth in a model). Let M be a model 〈W,NO,NP, V 〉 and
w ∈W . The truth of any formula p in M is defined inductively as follows:
1. standard valuation conditions for the boolean connectives;
2. M, w |= Op iff ||p||M ∈ NO(w),
3. M, w |= Psp iff ||p||M ∈ NP(w),
4. M, w |= Pwp iff W − ||p||M 6∈ NO(w),
where, as usual, ||p||M is the truth set of p wrt to M:6
||p||M = {w ∈W :M, w |= p} .
A formula p is true at a world in a model iff M, w |= p; true in a model M,
written M |= p iff for all worlds w ∈W , M, w |= p; valid in a frame F , written
F |= p iff it is true in all models based on that frame; valid in a class C of frames,
written C |= p, iff it is valid in all frames in the class. Analogously, an inference
rule P1, . . . Pn ⇒ C (where P1, . . . Pn are the premises and C the conclusion)
is valid in a class C of frames iff, for any F ∈ C, if F |= P1, . . . ,F |= Pn then
F |= C7.
We can now characterise different classes of deontic neighbourhood frames
that are adequate of the deontic systems in Table 4.1.
Definition 4.4 (Frame Properties). Let F = 〈W,NO,NP〉 be a deontic neigh-
bourhood frame.
• ✷-supplementation : F is ✷-supplemented, ✷ ∈ {O,P}, iff for any w ∈
W and X,Y ⊆W , X ∩ Y ∈ N✷(w)⇒ X ∈ N✷(w)& Y ∈ N✷(w);
• Pw-coherence: F is Pw-coherent iff for any w ∈ W and X ⊆ W , X ∈
NO(w)⇒ W −X 6∈ NO(w);
• Ps-coherence: F is Ps-coherent iff for any w ∈ W and X ⊆ W , X ∈
NP(w)⇒W −X 6∈ NO(w);
• AFCPO-permission : F is AFCPO-permitted iff for any w ∈ W and
X,Y ⊆W , X ∪ Y ∈ NP(w)&W − Y ∈ NO(w)⇒ X ∈ NP(w);
• AFCPP-permission : F is AFCPP-permitted iff for any w ∈ W and
X,Y ⊆ W , X ∪ Y ∈ NP(w)&W − X 6∈ NO(w)&W − Y 6∈ NO(w) ⇒
X ∈ NP(w)&X ∈ NP(w);
• AFCP2P-permission : F is AFCP2P-permitted iff for any w ∈ W and
X,Y ⊆W , X ∪ Y ∈ NP(w)&W −X 6∈ NO(w)⇒ X ∈ NP(w);
6Whenever clear from the context we drop the references to the model.
7Of course, if any Pk has the form ⊢ p then F |= P1 trivially means F |= p.
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• IFCPO-permission : F is IFCPO-permitted iff for any w ∈ W and
X,Y, Z ⊆W , X ∪ Y ∈ NP(w)&Z ⊆ (W − Y )&W −Z ∈ NO(w)⇒ X ∈
NP(w);
• IFCPP-permission : F is IFCPP-permitted iff for any w ∈ W and
X,Y, Z,Q ⊆ W , X ∪ Y ∈ NP(w)&Z ⊆ X &Q ⊆ Y &W − Z 6∈
NO(w)&W −Q 6∈ NO(w)⇒ X ∈ NP(w)& Y ∈ NP(w);
• IFCPP-permission : F is IFCP2P-permitted iff for any w ∈ W and
X,Y, Z ⊆W , X∪Y ∈ NP(w)&Z ⊆ X &W−Z 6∈ NO(w)⇒ X ∈ NP(w).
Here below are some relevant characterisation results. The proofs are in the
Appendix.
Lemma 4.1. For any deontic neighbourhood frame F ,
1. Ds is valid in the class of Ps-coherent frames;
2. Dw is valid in the class of Pw-coherent frames;
3. AFCPO is valid in the class of AFCPO-permitted frames;
4. AFCPP is valid in the class of AFCPP-permitted frames;
5. AFCP2P is valid in the class of AFCP2P-permitted frames;
6. IFCPO is valid in the class of IFCPO-permitted frames;
7. IFCPP is valid in the class of IFCPP-permitted frames;
8. IFCP2P is valid in the class of IFCP2P-permitted frames.
Completeness results for the three deontic systems are ensured: again see
the Appendix for a proof.
Theorem 4.1.
(a) the system E is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of deontic neigh-
bourhood frames;
(b) the system Min is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of Ps- and Pw-
coherent frames;
(c) the system FCP1 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of IFCPO- and
IFCPP-permitted frames;
(d) the system FCP2 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of AFCPO-
and AFCPP-permitted frames;
(e) the systemFCP3 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class ofP-supplemented,
AFCPO- and AFCPP-permitted frames;
(f) the system FCP4 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of AFCPO-
and AFCP2P-permitted frames;
(g) the system FCP5 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of IFCPO- and
IFCP2P-permitted frames;
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(h) the systemFCP6 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class ofP-supplemented,
IFCPO- and IFCP2P-permitted frames.
Finally, a corollary showing the relative strength of the six deontic systems.
Corollary 4.1.
(i) FCP2 ⊂ FCP1 ⊂ FCP3 ⊂ FCP6,
FCP2 ⊂ FCP4 ⊂ FCP5 ⊂ FCP6 and
FCP1 ⊂ FCP5.
(ii) Let L1,L2 ∈ {FCPi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 6}, and let C1 and C2 be classes of frames
adequate for L1 and L2. If L1 ⊂ L2 then C2 ⊂ C1.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated how, and if the notion of free choice permis-
sion is admissible in modal deontic logic. As is well known, several problems
can be put forward in regard to this notion, the most fundamental of them be-
ing the so-called Permission Explosion Problem, according to which all systems
containing FCP and closed under RM and RM-P license the derivation of any
arbitrary permission whenever at least one specific permission is true.
We argued (Section 1.1) that a plausible solution to this problem is to jump
from monotonic into classical deontic logics, i.e., systems closed under RE but
not RM. This solution does not necessarily mean that the resulting deontic
system is very weak, as far as permission is concerned, if further schemata and
inference rules are added (Sections 2.3 and 4.2).
The basic intuitions for extending classical deontic logics are the following:
1. We assume in background the distinction between norms and obligations/permissions.
While we conceptually accept that the normative system may contain con-
flicting norms, it is logically inadmissible that such norms generate ac-
tual conflicting obligations/permissions since conflicts must be rationally
solved, otherwise no obligation/permission can be obtained; hence, we
validate schemata Ds and Dw;
2. Free choice permission is strong permission, meaning that it is a permission
generated by explicit permissive norms;
3. The possibility of detaching single strong permissions from disjunctive
strong permissions, i.e., Psq from Ps(p ∨ q) strictly depends on the fact
that O¬p is not the case.
Taking the above points into account, we thus proposed different guarded vari-
ants of FCP that significantly increase the inferential power of the logic. In
particular, six Hilbert-style classical deontic systems were presented.
We observed that four of these systems are classical modal systems, while we
can have other two acceptable systems which are monotonic. In fact, the fact
that those two systems are closed under RM does not lead to full Permission
Explosion, but only to a “controlled” version of it: indeed, in systems like
FCP3 any permission is obtainable via free choice permission only if it is not
incompatible with existing prohibitions.
Some directions for future work can be identified. In particular:
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• It is still an open issue to fully discuss the Resource Sensitivity Problem
in our setting. In fact, while we argued that this problem goes beyond
our paper, there are scenarios where our intuitions are relevant for this
problem as well. For example, suppose that there is a fruit basket in the
kitchen containing a banana and an apple. Bob and Alice are permitted
to eat the banana or the apple and Alice first eats the former. Bob cannot
do anything but take the apple. However, if Bob is allergic of apples, so
no permission can be reasonably derived because it is forbidden for him
to eat the apple.
• Our idea of free choice permission relies on the fact that no strong permis-
sion can be detached from a disjunctive permissive expression if another
norm allows for deriving a conflicting obligation. Hence a full understand-
ing of schemata such as AFCPO or AFCPP may benefit for an explicit
logical treatment of the logic of norms adopting defeasible reasoning [11].
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A Basic Properties of the Deontic Systems
Let us start by proving Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.1. For any deontic neighbourhood frame F ,
1. Ds is valid in the class of Ps-coherent frames;
2. Dw is valid in the class of Pw-coherent frames;
3. AFCPO is valid in the class of AFCPO-permitted frames;
4. AFCPP is valid in the class of AFCPP-permitted frames;
5. AFCP2P is valid in the class of AFCP2P-permitted frames;
6. IFCPO is valid in the class of IFCPO-permitted frames;
7. IFCPP is valid in the class of IFCPP-permitted frames;
8. IFCP2P is valid in the class of IFCP2P-permitted frames.
Proof. The proof for case (1) is straightforward. The proof of (2) is trivial and
standard. Both are omitted.
Case (3) – Consider any frame F that is AFCPO-permitted but such that
F 6|= AFCPO. This means that there exists a model M = 〈W,NO,NP, V 〉
based on F such that M 6|= AFCPO, i.e., there is a world w ∈W where
M, w |= Ps(p ∨ q) ∧O¬p (4)
M, w 6|= Psq (5)
By construction, from (5) we have ||q||M 6∈ NP(w), while from (4) we have
||p||M ∪ ||q||M ∈ NP(w) and W − ||p||M ∈ NO(w), so F is not AFCPO-
permitted.
Cases (4) and (5) – The proofs are similar to the one for Case (3) and are
omitted.
Case (6) – As usual in these cases, the proof must show that, on the class of all
IFCPO-permitted frames, for any model M based on F and for any world w
in it,
Ps(p ∨ q) and O¬r are true in M at w and r → ¬q is valid in F ⇒
⇒ Psp is true in M at w.
Cases (7) and (8) – The proofs are similar to the one for Case (6) and are
omitted.
The definitions of some basic notions and of canonical model for the classical
bimodal logic E (just consisting of RE for O and Ps) are standard.
In the rest of this section when we refer to a Deontic System S we mean one
the logic axiomatised in Section 4.
Definition A.1 (S-maximality). A set w is maximal iff it is S-consistent and
for any formula p, either p ∈ w, or ¬p ∈ w.
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Lemma A.1 (Lindenbaum’s Lemma). For any Deontic System S, any consis-
tent set w of formulae can be extended to an S-maximal set w+.
Definition A.2 (Canonical Model [10, 21]). A canonical neighbourhood model
M = 〈W,NO,NP, V 〉 for any system S in our language L (where S ⊇ E) is
defined as follows:
1. W is the set of all the S-maximal sets.
2. For any propositional letter p, ‖p‖M := |p|S, where |p|S := {w ∈ W | p ∈
w}.
3. If ✷ ∈ {O,Ps}, letN✷ :=
⋃
w∈W N✷(w) where for each world w, N✷(w) :=
{‖ai‖M | ✷ai ∈ w}.
Lemma A.2 (Truth Lemma [10, 21]). If M = 〈W,NO,NP, V 〉 is canonical for
E, then for any w ∈ W and for any formula p, p ∈ w iff M, w |= p.
Thus, we have as usual basic completeness result for E. To cover the other
systems, it is enough to prove that all frame properties for the relevant schemata
and rules are canonical.
Lemma A.3. The frame properties of Definition 4.4 are canonical.
Proof. The proofs for✷-supplementation , Pw-coherence, andPs-coherence
are standard.
AFCPP-permission – Let us consider a canonical model M for AFCPP,
any world w in it, and any truth sets such that ||p||M ∪ ||q||M ∈ NP(w) and
W − ||q||M ∈ NO(w). Clearly, ||p ∨ q||M ∈ NP(w). Since AFCPP is valid
(Lemma 4.1), then Psp ∈ w. By construction, this means that ||p||M ∈ NP(w),
thus the model is AFCPP-permitted.
AFCPO-permission and AFCP2P-permission– Similar to the case above.
IFCPP-permission – Let us consider a canonical model M for IFCPP, any
world w in it, and any truth sets such that ||p||M∪||q||M ∈ NP(w), W−||r||M 6∈
NO(w), and W − ||s||M 6∈ NO(w). Clearly, ||p ∨ q||M ∈ NP(w). Also, as-
sume ||r||M ⊆ ||p||M and ||r||M ⊆ ||q||M. Since IFCPP is valid (Lemma 4.1)
then Psp ∧ Psq ∈ w. By construction, this means that ||p||M ∈ NP(w) and
||q||M ∈ NP(w), thus the model is IFCPP-permitted.
IFCPO-permission and IFCP2P-permission– Similar to the case above.
Hence, the following result is ensured.
Theorem 4.1.
(a) the system E is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of deontic neigh-
bourhood frames;
(b) the system Min is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of Ps- and Pw-
coherent frames;
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(c) the system FCP1 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of IFCPO- and
IFCPP-permitted frames;
(d) the system FCP2 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of AFCPO-
and AFCPP-permitted frames;
(e) the systemFCP3 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class ofP-supplemented,
AFCPO- and AFCPP-permitted frames;
(f) the system FCP4 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of AFCPO-
and AFCP2P-permitted frames;
(g) the system FCP5 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of IFCPO- and
IFCP2P-permitted frames;
(h) the systemFCP6 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class ofP-supplemented,
IFCPO- and IFCP2P-permitted frames.
Finally, let us prove Corollary 4.1.
Corollary 4.1.
(i) FCP2 ⊂ FCP1 ⊂ FCP3 ⊂ FCP6,
FCP2 ⊂ FCP4 ⊂ FCP5 ⊂ FCP6 and
FCP1 ⊂ FCP5.
(ii) Let L1,L2 ∈ {FCPi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 6}, and let C1 and C2 be classes of frames
adequate for L1 and L2. If L1 ⊂ L2 then C2 ⊂ C1.
Proof. Case (i) – For FCP2 ⊆ FCP1 we first notice that for every formula
p, ⊢ p → p; hence, axioms AFCPO and AFCPP can be considered as simple
instances of IFCPO and ICFPP respectively.
To show that the inclusion is strict the model below provides an AFCPO-
permitted model that does not validate IFCPO.
Let M = 〈W,NO,NP, V 〉, where:
• W = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5};
• V (a) = {w1, w4, w5}, V (b) = {w2, w3, w4} and V (c) = {w1, w2};
• NO(w1) = {{w4}}; and
• NP(w1) = {{w1, w2, w3}}.
It is easy to verify that the model is AFCPO-permitted, Ps(¬a∨c) and O(a∧c)
are true in w1: ||¬a ∨ c||M = {w1, w2, w3} ∈ NP(w1) and ||a ∧ c||M = {w4} ∈
NO(w1), and clearly a→ ¬¬a. However, ||c||M = {w1, w2} /∈ NP(w1).
For FCP1 ⊆ FCP3 it is enough to prove the following showing that IFCPO
and IFCPP are derivable from AFCPO and AFCPP and RM. (RM is valid
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in every classical modal logic containing M [10].)
1. Ps(p ∨ q) ∧Or Hyp.
2. r → ¬p Hyp.
3. Ps(p ∨ q) 1, CPL
4. Or 1, CPL
5. Or→ O¬p 2, RM
6. O¬p 4, 5, CPL
7. (Ps(p ∨ q) ∧O¬p)→ Psq AFCPO
8. Psq 3, 6, 7, CPL
1. Ps(p ∨ q) ∧Pwr ∧Pws Hyp.
2. r → p Hyp.
3. s→ q Hyp.
4. Pwr → Pwp 2, RM
5. Pws→ Pwq 3, RM
6. Pwr 1, CPL
7. Pws 1, CPL
8. Ps(p ∨ q) 1, CPL
9. Pwp 4, 6, CPL
10. Pwq 5, 7, CPL
11. (Ps(p ∨ q) ∧Pwr ∧Pws)→ (Psp ∧Psq) AFCLP
12. Psp ∧Psq 8, 9, 10, CPL
If we take the model used in the previous case and we add {w1, w2} to
NP(w1), obtaining NP(w1) = {{w1, w2, w3} , {w1, w2}}, then we have a non O-
supplemented IFCPO-permitted model falsifyingM. Now the model is IFCPO-
permitted, but not O-supplemented: ||a ∧ c||M = {w4} ∈ NO(w1), {w4} =
||a||M ∩ ||c||M, but ||a||M, ||c||M /∈ NO(w1), falsifying the following instance of
M: O(a ∧ c)→ Oa ∧Oc.
For FCP2 ⊂ FCP4, and FCP1 ⊂ FCP5 it is immediate to verify that
AFCP2P implies AFCPP in CPL but not the other way around; similarly for
IFCP2P and IFCPP.
The second derivation given in the case of FCP1 ⊂ FCP3 can be trivially
adjusted to show that FCP5 ⊆ FCP6, for the strictness of the inclusion we can
reuse the model given in the same case.
For FCP4 ⊆ FCP5, we can reuse the derivation that shows that IFCPP is
a derived rule in FCP3, using Ps(p ∨ q) ∧Pwr in step 1. and axiom AFCP2P
in step 11.
To show that the inclusion is strict consider the modelM = 〈W,NO,NP, V 〉,
where
• W = {w1, w2, w3, w4},
• NO(w1) = {{w1}},
• NP(w1) = {{w1, w2, w3} , {w1, w2}},
• V (a) = {w1, w2}, V (b) = {w1, w4}, V (c) = {w2, w3}.
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It is immediate to verify that the model is IFCP2P-permitted but notAFCP2P-
permitted; indeed, M, w1 |= Ps(a ∨ c) ∧Pw(a ∧ b) but M, w1 6|= Psa,
For FCP3 ⊂ FCP6 the result follows immediately from the fact that
FCP2 ⊂ FCP4.
Case (ii) – The result follows from Case (i) above and Theorem 4.1.
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